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I. INTRODUCTION
The recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in United
States Department of Labor v. Triplett' will undoubtedly frustrate
the efforts of West Virginia coal miners seeking to recover benefits2
under the federal Black Lung Benefits Act.3 As a result of this de-
cision, black lung claimants are not likely to find attorneys willing
to represent them.4 This decision overruled the West Virginia Su-
1. 110 S. Ct. 1428 (1990).
2. See Committee on Legal Ethics v. Triplett, 378 S.E.2d 82, 89-91 (W. Va. 1988), rev'd, 110
S. Ct. 1428 (1990).
3. 30 U.S.C. § 901-62 (1988).
4. See Triplett, 378 S.E.2d at 89-91.
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preme Court of Appeal's holding that the fee limitations imposed
by the Department of Labor (DOL) upon those representing black
lung claimants were unconstitutional. 5 The West Virginia court found
that these fee limitations, as they were applied, effectively denied
black lung claimants the "ability to find competent lawyers to rep-
resent them." '6
Justice Neely, writing for the majority of the West Virginia court,
noted that the black lung claims process is "procedurally, factually,
and legally complex." 7 The grant or denial of benefits often means
the difference between life or death, sufficient diet or malnourish-
ment, and minimal medical care or no medical care at all.8 Forcing
a miner to bear the burden of proof with regard to complex issues
of law, fact, and medicine is no small burden considering the fact
that only one in ten coal miners ever graduate from high school.'
In addition, responsible coal operators opposing these claims often
pay premium prices for experienced counsel. 0 Thus, the potential
exists that an unrepresented claimant will be placed at a severe dis-
advantage.
Both the West Virginia court and the Supreme Court agreed that
if the DOL's fee scheme operated in such a manner as to deny
claimants the ability to obtain counsel, the scheme would violate
the claimants' rights to procedural due process." However, the two
courts diverged at this point. The factual record upon which the
5. Id. at 93.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 92.
8. Black Lung Legislation, 1971-72: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Sen.
Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92nd Cong., Ist & 2nd Sess. 109 (1985).
9. Brief for Respondent at 17, United States Dep't. of Labor v. Triplett, 110 S. Ct. 1428
(1990)'(Nos. 88-1671 & 88-1688) (citing Department of Labor, Employment Standards Administration,
A Sample Survey of All Sources of Both Monetary and Nonmonetary Income of Black Lung Ben-
eficiaries 14 (1983)).
The typical miner received little formal education; only one in ten graduated from high school.
In fact, three-fourths of these miners did not even attend high school. Widow beneficiaries tended
to have slightly more education than miner beneficiaries, with 18% being high school graduates. A
few widow beneficiaries (4%) attended college. Id.
10. A "responsible operator feels ... he can well afford ... to spend $5,000 to $10,000 to
fight a non-paid attorney." Investigation of the Backlog in Black Lung Cases: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Labor Relations of the House Comm. of Education and Labor, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
22 (1985) (Statement of Martin Sheinman, Esquire).
11. U.S. Dept. of Labor v. Triplett, 110 S. Ct. 1428, at 1433.
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West Virginia court relied to invalidate the DOL's fee scheme was
characterized by the Supreme Court as "blatantly insufficient.' 12
This comment will examine the Supreme Court's holding in the
Triplett case and the likely effect this holding will have upon future
challenges to the DOL's fee regulations.
A. Prior Law
The Black Lung Benefits Act" (Act) provides funds to miners
who have been totally disabled by black lung. Claimants seeking to
recover benefits under this Act are entitled to obtain attorney rep-
resentation. 14 When a claimant is successful in obtaining benefits,
the employer, his insurer, or in some cases, the Black Lung Disability
Trust Fund,15 must pay the claimant's attorney a fee "reasonably
commensurate with the necessary work done."' 6
Lawyers and other representatives seeking a fee pursuant to this
Act must submit an application for such fees to the appropriate
tribunal before whom the services were performed. 7 Consensual
agreements between the claimant and his representative as to the
12. Id.
13. Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, 83 Stat. 792 as amended, 30 U.S.C. § 901-62 (1988).
14. Triplett, 378 S.E. 2d at 91. "[I]n black lung litigation, it is clear that Congress intended
that lawyers be used by claimants because it specifically provides for lawyers, and for payment of
a reasonable attorney's fee." Id.
15. 30 U.S.C. § 932(a) (incorporating 33 U.S.C. § 928(a) (1982).
16. 20 C.F.R. § 725.366(b).
Any fee ... shall be reasonably commensurate with the necessary work done and shall
take into account the quality of the representation, the qualifications of the representative,
the complexity of the legal issues involved, the level of proceedings to which the claim was
raised, the level at which the representative entered the proceedings and any other infor-
mation which may be relevant to the amount of fee requested.
Id.
17. 20 C.F.R. § 725.366(a).
A representative seeking a fee for services performed on behalf of a claimant shall
make application therefor to the deputy commissioner, administrative law judge, or ap-
propriate appellate tribunal, as the case may be, before whom the services were per-
formed .... The application shall be supported by a complete statement of the extent and
character of the necessary work done, and shall indicate the professional status (e.g., at-
torney, paralegal, law clerk, lay representative or clerical) of the person performing such
work, and the customary billing rate for each such person.
1991]
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amount of fee to be charged are prohibited, 18 and no fee is awarded
unless the claimant is successful. 19 However, following the West Vir-
ginia court's opinion which declared the DOL's fee scheme uncon-
stitutional, lawyers in West Virginia were free to contract with black
lung claimants for contingent fees. 2° Considering the large number
of black lung claims filed in West Virginia yearly, the West Virginia
court's holding in the Triplett case created a significant split of au-
thority.21
B. Facts
In 1978, George R. Triplett, a lawyer whose principal office is
located in Randolph County, West Virginia, began representing
claimants seeking recovery under the Black Lung Benefits Act.2 As
a former miner, Triplett was well acquainted with black lung and
the suffering that accompanied those afflicted with this disease. Tri-
plett was also familiar, with the DOL's rules and regulations re-
quiring that all fees be approved by the appropriate tribunal before
whom the services were performed. 23 Nevertheless, Triplett requested
and received contingent fees from fifteen of his clients. u The con-
tingent fee agreements amounted to approximately twenty-five per-
cent of the claimants' accrued awards.Y Believing that the DOL was
contemplating changing its fee regulations, Triplett deposited the
amounts received into bank accounts in his name as "attorney on
escrow" for the individual claimants. 26 Thus, Triplett's contractual
18. 20 C.F.R. § 725.365 "No contract or prior agreement for a fee shall be valid." Id. See
also 33 U.S.C. § 928(c). Anyone receiving an unapproved fee is subject to a fine of $1,000 or im-
prisonment for not more than one year or both.
19. See General Dynamics v. Harrigan, 848 F.2d 321 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 992
(1988).
20. See Committee on Legal Ethics v. Triplett, 378 S.E.2d 82.
21. No other states have declared the DOL's fee provisions unconstitutional.
22. Appendix C at 45a, Committee on Legal Ethics v. Triplett, 378 S.E.2d 82 (No. 86-056).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. 20 C.F.R. § 725.502. If the claimant is found eligible for benefits, he will receive a lump
sum payment representing benefits that have accrued from the onset of the disability to the date of
the award. Thereafter, the claimant receives a monthly benefit. Id.
26. Appendix C at 50a-51a, Committee on Legal Ethics v. Triplett, 378 S.E.2d 82 (No. 86-
[Vol. 93
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agreements for contingent fees and the receipt of these unapproved
fees was in direct contravention of the controlling regulations.
C. Procedural History: Hearings Before the Committee on Legal
Ethics of the West Virginia State Bar
For these violations, charges were brought by the Committee on
Legal Ethics of the West Virginia State Bar (Committee). 27 The Com-
mittee found Triplett's refusal to abide by the DOL's regulations
rendered him in violation of various provisions of the West Virginia
Code of Professional Responsibility. 2 Consequently, the Committee
recommended that Triplett be suspended from the practice of law
for a period of six months. 29 The Committee then sought enforce-
ment of this sanction in the West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals .0
I. THE MmoRrr- OPINION OF THE WEST VIELGi_1A SUPREME
COURT OF APPEALS
The West Virginia court recognized that in order to impose the
Committee's recommended sanctions upon Mr. Triplett, the regu-
lations which he was found to have violated would have to pass
constitutional muster. 1 The court began its analysis by acknowl-
edging that "the mere denial to a claimant of counsel of his choice
(or for that matter, any counsel) does not necessarily imply a denial
of due process rights." ' 32 The West Virginia court then proceeded
to follow the analysis used by the Supreme Court in the case of
Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors33 to determine if
the claimants' rights to procedural due process had been violated.
27. Id. at 48a.
28. Id. at 50a. Triplett was found guilty of violating DR I- 102(A)(4), (5), and (6) of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer should not:
(4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.
(5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
(6) Engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.
29. Id. at 50a-51a.
30. Triplett, 378 S.E.2d 82.
31. Id. at 95.
32. Id. at 85.
33. 473 U.S. 305 (1985).
1991]
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In Walters, the Court followed the test set out in Mathews v.
Eldridge4 in reaching its conclusion that the ten dollar fee limitation
which was allowed to be paid an attorney or agent representing
veterans seeking benefits from the Veterans' Administration (VA)
did not violate veterans' rights to procedural due process. 35 In keep-
ing with Walters, the court in this case also followed the Mathews
test .36
The Mathews test requires that a court weigh three specific in-
terests.3 7 First, the court must take into account the private interest
that will be affected by the official action.38 Second, the court is
required to consider the risk of an erroneous deprivation under the
present system, and the effect additional or substitute procedural
safeguards will have on the present system.39 And third, the court
must take into account the government's interest in maintaining the
existing system.40
However, before applying the Mathews test, the West Virginia
court attempted to establish the underlying proposition that the pres-
ent system rendered attorney representation unavailable.4 1 Although
it did not have the kind of statistical evidence before it that the
Supreme Court had available in Walters, the West Virginia court
asserted that affidavits submitted by several attorneys sufficiently
established the proposition that attorneys were unwilling to represent
claimants under the present system.42 The West Virginia court cited
the long delay in receiving payment 43 without any provision for in-
34. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
35. Walters, 473 U.S. 305 (1985).
36. Triplett, 378 S.E.2d 82.
37. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 321.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Triplett, 378 S.E.2d at 89-91.
42. Id. at 92.
43. Seventy-eight percent of the cases heard at the Administrative Law Judge level between
October 1, 1983, and August 21, 1984 took in excess of two years to adjudicate. These statistics do
not include time for administrative hearings or appeals. Delays in Processing and Adjudicating Black
Lung Claims: Hearing Before the Employment and Housing and Housing Subcommittee of the House
Committee on Government Operations, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. at 41 (1985) (GAO Report HRD-85-
19).
[Vol. 93
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terest, and the shortage of premiums to offset the contingent nature4
of the work as the two factors which led most attorneys to balk at
the idea of representing black lung claimants. 45
While the regulations purport to compensate for these factors,
the West Virginia court surmised that the factual record before it
clearly indicated that this was not the case. This finding led the
court to recognize that "a law nondiscriminatory on its face may
be grossly discriminatory in its operation."4 7
After establishing the central proposition that attorney repre-
sentation was unavailable to black lung claimants, the court applied
the Mathews test in order to discern whether or not this deprivation
violated the claimants' rights to procedural due process. The court
first determined that the black lung claimants' property interests at
stake in this case were analogous to the welfare recipients' property
interests considered in Goldberg v. Kelly. In Goldberg, the Supreme
Court held that a welfare recipient facing a possible termination of
benefits was entitled to be represented by a lawyer. 49 Similarly, since
"black lung benefits are awarded only in cases of total disability or
death [and] . . . may well provide the only means of subsistence"50
the West Virginia court decided that the first element of the Mathews
test weighed in favor of granting black lung claimants free access
to counsel.51
Secondly, the court found the claimants were likely to be er-
roneously deprived of their benefits under the present system. 52 Due
to the complexity, adversarial nature, and lack of alternative means
of representation throughout the black lung claims process, the court
believed attorney representation was a virtual necessity.53 Unlike the
44. Id. at 55-56. The overall approval rate from January, 1982 through March, 1988 under
the eligibility criteria of the 1981 amendment was 5.8%.
45. Triplett, 378 S.E.2d at 91.
46. Id. at 89.
47. Triplett, 378 S.E.2d at 89 (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, at 17 n.11 (1956)).
48. Triplett, 378 S.E.2d at 92.
49. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270-76 (1970).
50. Triplett, 378 S.E.2d at 91-92.
51. Id. at 93.
52. Id. at 92.
53. Id.
1991]
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Veterans Administration proceedings dealt with in Walters, where
the Supreme Court stated that "surely Congress desired that the
[VA] proceedings be as informal and nonadversarial as possible,"54
the West Virginia court concluded that black lung litigation is free
of any "homey claimant-oriented ambiance." 5
Finally, the court examined the third interest to be considered
under the Mathews test, namely, the government's interest in main-
taining the current fee regulations.56 Since the Disability Trust Fund
or a responsible operator will ultimately be liable for a successful
claimant's attorney fees, the court found that the DOL had a real
interest in maintaining its current regulations to assure that neither
of these sources of funds were overcharged by successful claimants'
attorneys . 7 In addition, the court also found that the DOL had a
legitimate interest in protecting claimants from entering into im-
provident agreements with attorneys which would "needlessly de-
plete their benefits.' ' However, the court downplayed this interest
by stating that under the present system claimants rarely have an
award to share with their attorney.5 9
After weighing each of the interests considered under the Ma-
thews test, the West Virginia court concluded that the DOL's current
regulations did "in fact severely restrict claimants' ability to find
competent lawyers to represent them.' ' 6 Hence, the court held that
the Mathews test, as it was applied to the black lung claims process,
warranted a different holding from that reached in Walters .6 Unlike
the VA's fee limitations upheld in Walters, the DOL's fee limitations
were held to violate the claimants' rights to procedural due process. 62
In addition, the court stated its holding had an independent basis
for support.63 The court said it was "fundamentally unfair for the
54. Waiters, 473 U.S. at 323-24.
55. Triplett, 378 S.E.2d at 88.
56. Id. at 91-92.
57. Id. at 91.
58. Id. at 91 (citing Moore v. Califano, 471 F.Supp. 146, 149 (1979)).
59. Triplett, 378 S.E.2d at 92.
60. Id. at 93.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
[Vol. 93
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government to confer a right with one hand, and take it away with
the other hand." 64 Since Congress had granted qualified claimants
the right to receive black lung benefits, it could not later deny the
claimants the procedural safeguards necessary to secure such a right.61
The West Virginia court viewed the right to obtain counsel as a
necessary procedural safeguard. 66
A. Justice Miller's Dissenting Opinion67
According to the dissent, the failure of the parties to raise the
constitutionality of the fee provisions below had provided the court
with an inadequate factual record. 68 The dissent stated that the fac-
tual record, which consisted of ex parte affidavits, was a "woefully
inadequate" basis for the broad sweeping factual conclusions reached
by the majority.69 The dissent concluded that generalized assertions
of procedural unfairness were "not the sort of evidence [which would]
permit a conclusion that the entire system is operated contrary to
its governing regulations." 70 The dissent held it was the DOL, and
not the black lung claimants, who had been deprived of procedural
due process. 71 After all, the DOL's entire fee scheme was declared
unconstitutional without the DOL ever having a chance to be heard
before the court.7 2
However, since the case did involve an important question of
federal law, the DOL was allowed to intervene and file a petition
for rehearing. 73
B. Petition for Rehearing
In its petition for rehearing, the DOL submitted statistics which
showed that in cases resulting in the grant or denial of benefits,
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Justice McHugh joined in the dissent.
68. Triplett, 378 S.E.2d at 98.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 99 n.2 (quoting Waiters, 110 S. Ct. at 324 n.1).
71. Triplett, 378 S.E.2d at 99.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 95.
1991]
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claimants were represented at the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
level ninety-two percent of the time.74 Twenty-nine percent of these
claimants prevailed as compared to the fraction of clients proceeding
pro se who only prevailed 11.670 of the time. 7 The West Virginia
court found that these statistics simply reinforced its original hold-
ing.76 A two and one-half times greater success rate for those claim-
ants that were represented was perceived as "constitutionally
significant for due process purposes. ' 77 Consequently, the DOL's
petition for rehearing was denied. 78
Both the DOL and the Committee petitioned for certiorari. Both
petitions were granted, and the case was argued before the United
States Supreme Court on January 16, 1990. 79
III. THE SUPt EmE CoURT's MAJoRITY OPmION
A. The Standing Issue
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court which
expressly overruled the holding rendered by the West Virginia court
in the Triplett case.80 Before turning to the merits of the case, the
Court felt it necessary to analyze the standing of the various par-
ties.81 The West Virginia Committee on Legal Ethics (Committee)
was held to have the "classic interest of a government prosecuting
agency arguing for the validity of a law upon which its prosecution
is based."' 82 The Court then cited its holding in Bowsher v. Synar 3
to support its conclusion that since the Committee had standing it
was unnecessary to determine whether or not the DOL had standingY
On the other hand, the Court did go to some length in discussing
74. Id. at 98.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Triplett, 110 S. Ct. 1428 (1990).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1431.
82. Id.
83. Triplett, 110 S. Ct. at 1431 (citing Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986)).
84. Id.
[Vol. 93
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whether or not Triplett had standing to assert the rights of the black
lung claimants.8 5
In Warth v. Seldin, the Supreme Court held that one "generally
must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his
claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties. ' 86
This is exactly what Triplett was doing in this case. Triplett's claim
to relief was based on the legal rights and interests of the black
lung claimants. Triplett contended that if the claimants were being
unconstitutionally deprived of their rights to due process under the
DOL's current fee regulations, his violation of these regulations could
not support the Committee's proposed sanction. 7
The Court stated that Triplett would have ordinarily been denied
standing even though the same allegedly illegal act which affected
the claimants, the fee provisions in this case, also affected him.88
However, as the Court noted in Secretary of State of Maryland v.
Joseph H. Munson Co.,89 when "enforcement of a restriction against
the litigant prevents a third party from entering into a relationship
with the litigant (typically a contractual relationship), third party
standing has been held to exist."' 9 Likewise, the Court held Triplett
had third party standing since the DOL's fee provisions effectively
precluded him from entering into any contractual relationship with
black lung claimants. 91
The majority also disagreed with Justice Marshall's view that
ASARCO v.Kadish92 rendered the Court's inquiry into third-party
standing inappropriate. 93 In ASARCO, the Court held:
When a state court has issued a judgement in a case where the plaintiffs in the
original action had no standing to sue under the principle governing federal courts,
we may exercise our jurisdiction on certiorari if the judgement of the state court
85. Id. at 1431-32.
86. Id. at 1431 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)).
87. Id. at 1431.
88. Id. (citing United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731-32. (1980)).
89. Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 954-58 (1984).
90. Triplett, 110 S. Ct. at 1432.
91. Id.
92. ASARCO v. Kadish, 109 S. Ct. 2037 (1989).
93. Triplett, 110 S. Ct. at 1432.
1991]
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causes direct, specific, and concrete injury to the parties who petition for our
review, where the requisites of a case or controversy are also met.9'
However, the Court asserted it was questionable whether states
had the "power, by granting or denying third-party standing, to
create or destroy federal causes of action." 95 Accordingly, the Court
professed to be following "longstanding precedent in ascertaining
the third party standing of a respondent in a case arising from state
court. "'
96
B. The Merits
There was no disagreement as to the merits of the case. 97 Ap-
plying an analysis gimilar to that applied in Walters,98 the Court
held that the DOL's fee scheme must be upheld. 99 As in Walters,
the Court began its analysis by noting the "heavy presumption of
constitutionality"'00 that should be accorded a "carefully considered
decision of a co-equal and representative branch of our Govern-
ment." 101 The Court stated that overcoming this presumption of con-
stitutionality would require "an extraordinarily strong showing of
probability of error under the present system and the probability
that the presence of attorneys would sharply diminish that possibility
to warrant a holding that the fee limitation denies claimants due
process of law."' 0 2
However, unlike the Court in Walters, the Court in this case
declined to evaluate the first two interests to be considered under
the Mathews test. Instead the Court singled out the third interest
to be considered under the Mathews test, namely the government's
interest in upholding the DOL's present fee scheme. 03 The Court
cited three legitimate governmental interests served by the present
94. ASARCO, 109 S. Ct. 2037, 2048.
95. Trilett, 110 S. Ct. at 1432.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1428.
98. Id. at 1432.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. (quoting Waiters, 473 U.S. 305, 319).
102. Id. (quoting Walters, 473 U.S. 305, 326).
103. Triplett, 110 S. Ct. at 1432-1433.
[Vol. 93
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system. First, the government's regulation of attorney fees paid by
claimants themselves serves to protect the claimants from their "im-
provident contracts, in the interest not only of themselves and their
families but of the public." 10 Second, when the fee is to be born
by the employer or Disability Trust Fund, the regulations assure
that those sources will not be depleted so as to deprive other eligible
claimants a source of compensation.105 Third, the delay in payment
of an attorney's fee until a final award is made ensures that the
payor will not be subjected to the needless task of obtaining a refund
in the case the decision is later reversed.10
However, the Court felt it unnecessary to pursue the Mathews
analysis, which was used in Walters, any further. The Court stated
that in Walters it assumed the VA's fee provisions would deny claim-
ants the ability to obtain an attorney. 1 7 Only then did the Court
apply the Mathews test in order to determine whether the unavail-
ability of counsel deprived claimants of their right to due process. 0
Since the unavailability of attorney representation was not apparent
from the factual record offered by Triplett, he was required to prove
the central proposition which was assumed in Walters, specifically,
that the DOL's current fee scheme had "made attorneys unavailable
at the time [he] violated the Act."'' 9 The Court stated that such a
showing would require the proof of two essential elements: "1) that
claimants could not obtain representation, and 2) that this una-
vailability of attorneys was attributable to the Government's fee re-
gime." 110
The Court admitted that the above showing would place a large
burden upon one challenging the constitutionality of these provi-
sions."' In any event, the Court found the evidence offered by Tri-
plett to meet this burden of proof was "blatantly insufficient, ' 1 1 2
104. Id. at 1432 (quoting Yeiser v. Dysart, 267 U.S. 540, 541 (1925)).
105. Triplett, 110 S. Ct. at 1433.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
1991]
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even if it was entirely unrebutted."3 The Court cited the statistics114
offered by the DOL as evidence that "claimants whose chances of
success are high enough to attract contingent fee lawyers have no
difficulty finding them." '115 Thus, Triplett failed to establish the cen-
tral proposition that claimants could not obtain attorney represen-
tation under the present system.
According to the Court, Triplett also failed to establish the causal
connection between the DOL's fee scheme and the unavailability of
attorneys.116 In finding to the contrary, the West Virginia court cited
the delay in receiving payment and the risk of nonrecovery as the
two most important reasons why lawyers are unwilling to represent
black lung claimants under the present system.1 7 Addressing this
assertion, the Supreme Court stated "the evidence to support this
economic assessment is similar to that for the unavailability of at-
torneys, small in volume, anecdotal in character, and self interested
in motivation."" 8 In fact, the Court stated it did not know how
the DOL could maintain a system which provided inadequate fees
even if it wanted to. 1" 9 The term "reasonable" fee has been inter-
preted by the courts to compensate both for delay' 20 and for the
risk of going unpaid.21 In sum, the Supreme Court felt the evidence
relied upon by the West Virginia court did not remotely establish
either that the claimants were unable to obtain attorney represen-
tation or that the cause of such inability was the DOL's existing
fee scheme.'2
The Supreme Court also rejected the West Virginia court's "in-
dependent basis for finding a due process violation."'1 23 The Court
113. Id. "The impressions of three lawyers that the current system has produced 'few' lawyers,
or 'fewer qualified attorneys' (whatever that means), and that 'many have left the field, are blatantly
insufficient to meet the respondents burden of proof even if entirely unrebutted.'
114. Id. "[I]n 1987 claimants were represented by counsel at the ALJ stage in 92% of the cases
resulting in grant or denial of benefits."
115. Triplett, 110 S. Ct. at 1434.
116. Id. at 1434-35.
117. Triplett, 378 S.E.2d at 91.
118. Triplett, 110 S. Ct. at 1434.
119. Id.
120. Hobbs v. Director, OWCP, 820 F.2d 1528, 1529 (9th Cir. 1987).
121. Risden v. Director OWCP, 11 BRBS 819, 824 (1980).
122. Triplett, 110 S. Ct. at 1435.
123. Id.
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stated that if the right to counsel were part of the statutory remedy
provided by Congress, the denial of the right to counsel would sim-
ply violate the statute."4 A violation of the statute would then make
it unnecessary to invoke the Due Process Clause.'2 Furthermore,
the Court believed this "independent basis" was not in fact inde-
pendent of the central proposition that the DOL's fee scheme had
operated in such a way that denied black lung claimants the right
to counsel.'2 Since the central proposition that attorney represen-
tation was unavailable under the DOL's present fee scheme was
never established, the Court also disposed of the West Virginia court's
alternative holding.1 7
C. Justice Stevens' Concurrence
Justice Stevens' discussion of the merits of this case followed up
on his dissent in Walters."-8 He reasoned that although the govern-
ment does have a legitimate interest in regulating fees, these res-
trictions "may not be so pervasive as to deny the individual the
right to consult and retain independent counsel."' 2 9 Unlike the show-
ing which he felt was made by the individuals in Walters, the claim-
ants in this case had failed to establish that the DOL's regulations
had this pervasive effect. 30 Consequently, he agreed that the DOL's
fee scheme was constitutional.
D. Justice Marshall's Concurrence
Justice Marshall went a step further to highlight the limited na-
ture of the Court's holding.131 After referring to the complexity 3 2
and adversarial nature133 of the black lung claims process which he
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See id. at 1439.
132. Id. at 1438.
133. Id.
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believed made these proceedings qualitatively different from the VA
proceedings, 1" 4 Marshall concluded that attorneys were necessary to
properly assert a claimant's rights under the Black Lung Benefits
Act. 135
But, he agreed with the majority's holding that the West Virginia
court had based its findings upon an inadequate factual record.1 6
He felt the record did raise legitimate concerns and suspicions that
black lung claimants were'unable to obtain attorney representation,
and that this unavailibility was attributable to the DOL's fee re-
gulations. 137 However, in his mind, these concerns and suspicions
were not enough to justify the West Virginia court's holding in this
case. 38 Justice Marshall did state that the Supreme Court's holding
in this case should not be viewed as a bar upon future challenges
to the DOL's fee structure. 39 In dicta, he indicated that such a
challenge may ultimately succeed if supported by a more fully de-
veloped factual record."4°
E. Analysis
Triplett, like Walters, reiterated the heavy presumption of con-
stitutionality and deference which should be accorded a decision
made by a co-equal branch of our government.' 4' The Court agreed
with Walters, 42 that the days of Lochner, 43 where courts supplanted
its judgement for that of the legislature's, are gone. 44 In this case
the Court adhered to this principle when it upheld the DOL's current
fee structure. 45
134. Id. at 1439.
135. Id. at 1438.
136. Id. at 1439.
137. Id. at 1439-40.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1439.
140. Id.
141. Triplett, 110 S. Ct. 1432.
142. Waiters, 473 U.S. at 323.
143. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 61 (1905).
144. Waiters, 473 U.S. at 323.
145. Triplett, 110 S. Ct. at 1432.
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The Court in Triplett also made it clear that Walters set no bright
line standards for judging the constitutionality of a law which may
limit a claimant's access to counsel. As the Court stated in Walters,
"due process is a flexible concept that the process required by the
Clause with respect to the termination of a protected interest will
vary depending upon the importance attached to the particular in-
terest and the particular circumstances under which the deprivation
may occur." 146
In addition, the Triplett decision stands for the proposition that
the Court will not attempt to balance the interest considered under
the Mathews test, as it did in Walters,147 until the challenger can
produce adequate factual evidence to prove he was deprived of a
procedure which he believes he was entitled to receive. 148 The con-
stitutionality of this deprivation will then be determined by balancing
the interests considered under the Mathews test.
Since Triplett failed to produce adequate factual evidence that
black lung claimants were effectively denied the ability to obtain
counsel, the Court was not compelled to expressly state the relative
weights it would assign to each of the interests considered under the
Mathews test. 49 However, the Court did express what conclusion it
would reach under the Mathews test if it were presented with an
adequate factual record. 50
In Walters, the Court assumed the ten dollar fee limitation would
deny claimants the ability to obtain counsel, but the limitations were
still upheld because the Court concluded that attorneys were not an
essential part of the process. 151 In the Triplett case, the same ultimate
conclusion was reached, albeit by a circuitous route. 52 In rejecting
the West Virginia court's alternative holding, the Court stated "it
seems to us this adds nothing to the prior analysis except the as-
sertion that the right to counsel, besides being constitutionally re-
146. Walters, 473 U.S. at 320.
147. Walters, 473 U.S. 305 (1985).
148. Triplett, 110 S. Ct. at 1433.
149. Id. at 1433-35.
150. Id. at 1435.
151. Waiters, 473 U.S. at 334.
152. Triplett, 110 S. Ct. at 1435.
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quired (as we have earlier assumed) was part of the statutory
"remedy" prescribed by Congress.' ' 53 Implicit within the Court's
parenthetical notation is the Court's conclusion that the interests of
the claimants would be held to outweigh those of the DOL if the
DOL's fee scheme precluded claimants from obtaining attorney rep-
resentation. 154 All that was left for Triplett to prove was what was
assumed in the Walters case-that the DOL's fee scheme effectively
denied claimants the ability to obtain counsel.' 55
If in reaching this conclusion, the Court simply assumed the
relative weights accorded the various interests under the Mathews
test by the West Virginia court to be correct, its reliance may be
misplaced. In its brief to the Supreme Court, the DOL presented
statistics which may indicate that the West Virginia court assigned
greater weight than was due to claimants' property interests at
stake. 156 The statistics submitted by the DOL showed that over ninety
percent of the black lung beneficiaries' households received social
security benefits. 57 In addition, thirty-one percent also received un-
ion pensions.'58 The DOL also highlighted the fact that miners are
awarded benefits if they are unable to work jobs associated with
the mining industry or engage in other comparable work. 59 It would
seem the DOL is correct in arguing "this is a less stringent test of
disability than in Mathews, where the benefits were available only
for inability to do any substantial gainful work in the national econ-
omy."160 It appears that the West Virginia court certainly overlooked
this evidence when it stated that black lung benefits "may well pro-
vide the only means of subsistence.' 6' Since the Supreme Court did
not express the relative weights to be accorded each of the interests
153. Id.
154. See id.
155. Id.
156. Brief for Petitioner at 45, United States Dep't. of Labor v. Triplett, 110 S. Ct. 1428 (1990)
(Nos. 88-1671 & 88-1688).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See 30 U.S.C. § 902(f)(1)(A).
160. Brief for Petitioner at 45, United States Dep't. of Labor v. Triplett, 110 S. Ct. 1428 (1990)
(Nos. 88-1671 & 88-1688).
161. Triplett, 378 S.E.2d at 93.
[Vol. 93
18
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 93, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 7
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol93/iss3/7
REPRESENTATION OF BLACK LUNG CLAIMANTS
under the Mathews test, it is not clear whether it considered these
statistics.
The Court's decision in the Triplett case does leave room for
speculation as to how each of these questions will be answered when
the Court is presented with an adequate factual record.1 62 For ex-
ample, since Triplett could not prove that attorney representation
was unavailable under the present system and that this unavailability
was attributable to the DOL's current fee scheme, the Court's as-
sumption that claimants were constitutionally entitled to represen-
tation by counsel may have been made simply to avoid superfluous
analysis. In the absence of concrete proof of some harm suffered,
the Court's adherence to justiciability requirements may have led it
to the conclusion that a constitutional pronouncement in this area
would be an imprudent choice.
As Justice Marshall stated, the Court should have been aware
that a detailed factual record was needed before the Court could
properly evaluate a challenge to this entire regulatory scheme. 163 In
keeping with the idea that the Court should not issue multifarious
pronouncements,64 Marshall was correct in asserting that the peti-
tions for certiorari should not have been granted in the first place,
or that they should have been dismissed as improvidently granted
when the insufficiency of the record was exposed. 165
Consequently, the precedential value of the Triplett decision may
lie more in its discussion of ASARCO v. Kadish than in its holding
on the merits.166 In ASARCO the Court concluded that the re-
spondent taxpayers would not have had standing if the Arizona court
had applied the federal standing requirements.1 67 But state courts are
not bound by the constraints imposed by Article III of the Con-
stitution and other federal justiciability requirements . 68 This is so
162. See Triplett, 110 S. Ct. at 1439. The Court stated that its holding "in no way precludes
a future challenge to the department's implementation of the Act, founded on a more developed
factual record." Id.
163. Id. at 1439 n.3.
164. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
165. Triplett, 110 S. Ct. 1439 n.3.
166. See Triplett, 110 S. Ct. 1428.
167. ASARCO v. Kadish, 109 S. Ct. 2037, 2045 (1989).
168. Id.
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even when the state court is deciding an issue of federal law. 69 If
the Court in ASARCO would have vacated the state court's judge-
ment because the respondents lacked standing to bring suit, this
would have rendered "nugatory the entire proceedings in the state
courts. 1 70 In effect, this would require state courts to adhere to
federal standing requirements anytime they wished to issue a binding
decision concerning a question of federal law.' 7'
A literal reading of ASARCO provides that as long as the party
petitioning for review meets the federal standing requirements, it is
irrelevant whether or not the respondent has standing.1 72 Indeed this
is exactly how Justice Marshall read ASARCO. 7 1 Extending the
ASARCO reasoning to this case, Marshall seems correct in con-
cluding that the majority's inquiry into Triplett's standing was un-
warranted since he was not the party petitioning a federal court for
review. However, a majority of the Court still finds it necessary to
examine a respondent's standing in a case arising from state court
if the respondent is attempting to assert the rights of another.
IV. CONCLUSION
As Justice Marshall stated, the Triplett decision should not be
seen as a bar upon future challenges to the DOL's fee structure.
Apparently all that will be needed for a successful challenge is an
adequate factual record which confirms that attorneys are unwilling
to represent black lung claimants because of the present fee scheme
imposed by the DOL. However, this factual record does not appear
to be forthcoming anytime in the near future. For one reason or
another, the government simply does not keep such statistics. Fur-
ther assistance in this area will probably have to come from an
independent agency.
In the meantime, black lung claimants will continue to suffer.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 2047.
171. Id.
172. See id. at 2048-49.
173. Triplett, 110 S. Ct. at 1436-38.
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Undoubtedly, many will be deprived of benefits they otherwise might
have recovered had they been afforded the opportunity to retain
counsel. Indeed this is a mockery of justice for the Legislature to
pass a piece of token legislation supposedly designed to provide black
lung claimants with benefits while failing to provide the means nec-
essary to procure these benefits. 174
Robert A. Campbell
174. See Allen v. State Human Rights Comm'n, 324 S.E.2d 99, at 121 (1984).
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